



Carleton
UNIVERSITY

Canada's Capital University

Terrorism & Counterterrorism

TSAS Summer Academy 2017

■ **Aim – Context and General Overview**

- Terrorism – definitional issues
- Canada's experience with terrorism
- Post-9/11 terrorism & Canada
- Canada's experience in context: key issues
- Counterterrorism – key issues
- Counterterrorism Strategies
- Counterterrorism post-9/11 in Canada
- Conclusion

- **Terrorism is an extant threat: diverse, dynamic, and complex**
 - Threat is not existential
 - Threat to Canada, Canadians, and Canada's interests (& values)
 - Threat is low-level: manageable under current conditions
 - Low-level \neq no threat. Threat is not linear: shocks inevitable
- **CT is complex, unforgiving, and not well understood**
 - Govt-wide + society responses essential
 - CT is never one-dimensional – layered, with multiple levels
 - Creating conditions for success requires time



Defining terrorism

- **No agreed definition: academia *or* internationally**
- **Legal, National, International, Academic, Public definitions & perceptions differ**
- **Generally taken to involve the use of politically motivated violence against noncombatants to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience.**
- **There are multiple manifestations, forms, and types of political violence;**
- **Not all political violence is terrorism**
- **Terrorism is a sub-category of political violence *not* vice-versa**
- **Problem of Civil War-Insurgency-Terrorism-extremism spectrum**



Criminal Code, Sec. 83.01 Act committed

- for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and
- with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling...to do or to refrain from doing any act, and that intentionally

(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of violence,

(B) endangers a person's life,

(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public,

(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C), or


(E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred to in any of clauses (A) to (C),

See also:

<http://craigforcese.squarespace.com/national-security-law-blog/2012/12/18/10-minute-primer-the-predicate-to-canadian-anti-terrorism-cr.html> & <https://vimeo.com/116806257>



Terrorism in Canada: context



- 1960-2015 = 1,845
- 871 in Canada met definitional T requirement
- 39% fail to meet 1 of 3 criteria
- 21% perpetrated aboard
- 14% = extremist

Extremist incidents are defined as serious threats, harm, murder, mayhem, and damage to property that are motivated and justified by extremist beliefs (such as hate crimes where no violence is perpetrated, or low-level incidents resulting in little damage, such as vandalism). – NB also differences with StatsCan data on hate crimes

- FLQ / Separatists (176 attacks between 1963-1972)
- SOF Doukhobors (144 incidents to '86, peak in '61 & '62)
- International terrorism “émigré”: fewer than 50 incidents overall
 - anti-Castro Cuban terrorism (1964-80);
 - anti-Yugoslav terrorism (Croatian);
 - Armenian terrorists (anti-Turkey)
- Sikh / Nationalist – Air India Flight 182, June 23, 1985: 329 dead (279 Canadians)
- Left Wing, e.g. Direct Action / Squamish Five / Wimmin's Fire Brigade (1980-83)
- Right Wing, less prevalent, but extant: to 1990 = 89 incidents
- Single-issue: anti-abortionist wave in 1990s; animal rights, eco



'a small and fragmented' problem?



Year	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
CIDB	26	17	29	22	22	54	27	55	43	44	23	12	28	11	23	?
GTD	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	5	4	2	0	3	4	3	5	6

- Terrorism & Extremism in CIDB (Canada, Abroad, Victim, Perpetrator)
- Attacks in Afghanistan on CF casualties included

T & VE in Canada 2001-2015 (Hiebert, 2016)

Type	Terrorism		Extremism	
	Incidents	Fatalities	Incidents	Fatalities
Actual event	35	3	64	8
Threat	15	0	10	0
Unsuccessful	12	0	6	0
Total	62	3	76	8

Terrorism

- 3 x fatalities
- Geography: 88% in QC (35%), ON (29%) & BC (24%) + AB (3), NL & NS
- Perpetrator motive info 45% cases
 - ENV = 13
 - REL = 9
 - Anarchist = 2
 - Supremacist = 2

Extremism

- 8 x fatalities: all Supremacist (Bourque = 3; 5 assaults & 5 killed in ON & AB)
- Supremacist = 49 (64%)
 - Usually lone actors/small group; various group affiliation
- ENV = 10 (all ALF)

Source: <https://www.csis.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2014-2016/index-en.php>



March, 2015: Anthrax (white powder) hoax letters to 4 Conservative MPs

August 2015: 2 x IEDs at Barrie (ON) water treatment plant

January 2016: Pepper spray attack on refugees, Vancouver

June 2016: ALF claims responsibility for 2 x trucks burned (Mississauga)

August 2016: Aaron Driver killed in Strathroy (ON)

September 2016: Haitian radio station firebombed (3rd time since 2012) Montreal

September 2016: Mosque firebombed in Hamilton (ON) [Guilty plea, 2017]

January 2017: Six dead & eight injured Quebec City mosque shooting. (Alexandre Bissonnette)

June 3, 2017: Christine Archibald killed in London (UK) attack

July 4, 2017: RCMP terrorism charges against Rehab Dughmash (Canadian Tire incident, June 3 - alleged left for Syria (April) & sent back)



Date	Case	Description	Outcome
2004	Khawaja	Project Awaken: Supporting UK group	Life (2008)
2006	Lapoleon	Hoax	Guilty: 6 mths
2006	Toronto-18	Project O-Sage	7 plead guilty; 5 found guilty 6 Stayed (5 x Peace Bonds); 1 charges dropped
2007	Said Namouh	Project Summon: Propaganda + Austrian bomb plot	Life (2010)
2010	Ottawa plot	Project Samossa: Ottawa bomb plot	1 plead guilty (Alizadeh) 24 yrs; 1 guilty (Ahmed) 12 yrs; 1 not guilty + 1 charges dropped
2010	Charest	Hoax	Guilty: 16 mths
2010	Thambithurai	Terror financing (LTTE)	Plead guilty: 6 mths
2011	Hersi	Project Severe: Attempted travel to Somalia	Guilty: 10 years
2012	Mouna Diab	Project Sagittaire: Material support (Hezbollah)	Case dropped by Crown (2014)
2013	VIA Rail	Project Smooth: Via Rail Plot	2 x Guilty: Life
2014	BC Plot	Project Souvenir: Canada Day Plot	Nuttall & Karody found guilty (2015); Stayed 2016: entrapment




General

- **Fewer incidents & fewer fatalities**
- **RW/Supremacist VE biggest threat**
 - 'fragmented and primarily pose a threat to public order and not to national security.' (CSIS, 2014)
- **Thwarting plots**
- **Diverse threat environment**

Specific

- **Foreign Fighters: 180+**
 - Returnees
 - & "good" foreign fighter
- **Lone Actors**
- **Low-Tech / Weapons**
- **Targets – discriminate & indiscriminate**
- **Material Support**
- **Internet/social media**



- **GTD to end 2016 = 170,000+ incidents 1970**
- **Just under 50% perpetrators unknown**
- **Generally 50% of attacks = 0 casualties**
- **Most terrorist groups survive less than 1 year**
 - To 2012, 2,300+ unique groups in GTD
 - Just under 50% conducted only a single attack; 70% conducted attacks only in a single year
 - Few groups attack with high frequency over long periods, but they are extremely destructive:
 - *25 groups account for 56% of total deaths (83,896) to end 2013 [See <http://terror.periscopic.com/>]*
- **Spatial issues: country, region, cities**



Five Strategies of Terrorism

1. Attrition – the battle of wills
2. Intimidation – reign of terror
3. Provocation – lighting the fuse
4. Spoiling – sabotaging the peace
5. Outbidding – zealots vs. sellouts

Five enduring goals of Terrorism

1. Regime Change
2. Territorial Change
3. Policy Change
4. Social Control
5. Status Quo

Crudely put, **groups which use terrorism are relatively successful in carrying out terrorist attacks**, and are influenced by a number of organisational factors, response to which indicates their likely success. Terrorism **campaigns have wide-ranging impacts at the social and political level with respect to strategic aims, but are much less effective at achieving ultimate goals**. While some intermediate goals are attained, these represent only partial successes, leaving ultimate policy goals largely unfulfilled. [Marsden, 2012; 145]



We cannot kill our way out of this

We cannot arrest our way out of this

We cannot talk our way out of this

Terrorism cannot be eradicated

Defeat terrorist groups & reduce appeal of
narratives/ideology

Jones & Libicki (2008): 1968-2006 648 T groups

648 groups: 244 still existed 2006; 404 ended – but 136
b/c splintering

Terrorist groups end for two major reasons (n=268)


1. Members decide to adopt nonviolent tactics and join the
political process (43 percent)

2. Local law-enforcement agencies arrest or kill key
members of the group (40 percent)

- Military force rarely the primary reason for the end of terrorist
groups (7 percent)
- Few groups achieve victory (10 percent).
- End by splintering: some members continue terrorism via existing or
creating new group



 2012	 2011	 2011	 2015	 2005	 2006
Prevent Individuals from engaging in terrorism	Pursue Investigate & Disrupt	Protect People, Homeland, & Interests	Challenging Violent Extremist Ideology	Prevent People turning to terrorism	Addressing conditions conducive to spread of terrorism
Detect Activities that may pose terrorist threat	Prevent stop people becoming / supporting terrorists	Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, & Defeat	Stopping People from becoming terrorists	Protect People & infrastructure	Prevent & combat terrorism
Deny Means & opportunities to carry out activities	Protect security to stop attack	Prevent WMD	Shaping The global environment	Pursue Terrorists globally	Build states' capacity & role of UN
Respond Mitigate threats	Prepare minimise impact of attack & recover	Eliminate Safe havens	Disrupting Terrorist activity in Australia	Respond To attacks & minimize consequences	Ensure respect for human rights for all & rule of law
		Build Partnerships	Effective response & recovery		



How to Respond:

- 1) **Learn to live with it**
- 2) **Where possible, address underlying root problems and causes**
- 3) **Avoid the over-militarization of response**
- 4) **Intelligence is the most vital element in successful CT**
- 5) **Respect orthodox legal frameworks and adhere to the democratically established rule of law**
- 6) **Co-ordinate security-related, financial, & technological preventive measures**
- 7) **Maintain strong credibility in counter-terrorist public argument**




“softer”

- **Principles & rule of law**
- **Capacity building**
- **Diplomacy**
- **Resilience**
- **Community outreach**
- **Public understanding**
- **Planning (prep)**
- **Response capabilities**

“harder”

- **Military ops abroad**
- **Military support**
- **Intelligence**
 - Liaison: home & abroad
 - Sources: covert, intrusive, human, technical
 - Sources: all + fusion & analysis
- **Legislation**
 - Regulations & administrative
- **Law enforcement**





‘A common pattern throughout Canadian history is the appearance of a real threat to security and public safety, followed by a state response that identifies and isolates the source of the threat (security intelligence), acts to eliminate or contain the threat (national security-law enforcement), and then goes on to construct suspect communities – ideological, ethnic, religious – from which threats emanate, and to marginalize, scrutinize, exclude, and delegitimize these communities (political policing)’ [Whitaker, Kealey, & Parnaby; 2012, 539-541]

- 1) Threat is real, low-level, persistent, diffuse, and dynamic
- 2) Threat spans the spectrum: Right; Religious; Single-Issue
- 3) Local, National, & International aspects in threat & response
- 4) Whole of Govt. + Society CT response essential & inevitable
- 5) Lack of public understanding of terrorism easily exploited for political ends



WANTED

CONSPIRACY TO COMBINE ARSON OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND OF PROPERTY USED BY INTERSTATE COMMERCE; CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY AN EMPLOY FACILITY; ARSON OF A BUILDING; ATTEMPTED ARSON OF A BUILDING

REBECCA J. RUBIN



Paraphrase from FBI

Aliases: Rebecca Suzanne Rubin, Rebecca Suzanne Rubin, "Lulu Mary", "Lulu"

DESCRIPTION


Date of Birth	April 18, 1973	Sex	Female
Place of Birth	1974-1975	Height	5'00"
Weight	100 lbs 145 pounds	Race	White
POB	921011010	Hair	Black
		Complexion	Darkened to Lt. Complexion

FRAMEWORK OF CANADA'S COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY



AIM
To counter domestic and international terrorism in order to protect Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests.

- PRINCIPLES**
1. Building resilience
 2. Terrorism is a crime and will be prosecuted
 3. Adherence to the rule of law
 4. Cooperation and partnerships
 5. Proportionate and measured response
 6. A flexible and forward-looking approach



Suggested further reading

Institute for Economics and Peace. 2016. Global Terrorism Index 2016. IEP Report 43 (November) Available free of charge: <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf>

English, Richard. 2009. 'Terrorism: How to Respond' Lecture/Presentation at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 8 October 2009' 2009 Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNfcGd1oY18>

Crenshaw, Martha . 2011. Why Terrorism is rejected or renounced. In Martha Crenshaw *Explaining Terrorism* (London and New York: Routledge) pp.206-222

Forcese, Craig and Kent Roach. 2015. 'History: A Short History of Canada's Over- and Underreaction to Terrorism' In Craig Forcese and Kent Roach *False Security: The Radicalization of Canadian Anti-Terrorism* (Toronto; Irwin Law) pp.21-81

Bjørgo, Tore. 2016. 'Counter-terrorism as crime prevention: a holistic approach' *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8:1 pp.25-44

Whitaker, Reg, Gregory S. Kealey and Andrew Parnaby. 2012. 'No More Mr. Nice Spy: CSIS and the Dark Side of the War on Terror' Reg Whitaker, Gregory S. Kealey and Andrew Parnaby, *Secret Service* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) pp.468-520

Della Porta, Donatella. 1992. On individual motivation in underground political organizations *International Social Movement Research* 4: pp.3-28

Conway, Maura. 2017. 'Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 40:1 pp.77-98