

## **COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH ON COUNTERING EXTREMIST VIOLENCE**

### **NEW INSIGHTS ON COUNTERTERRORISM ISSUES: Canada Anti-Terrorism Financial Regime; Developing Best Practices for Counter-Terrorism in Canada; Examining Possible Preconditions for Terrorism in Canada; and Insights into the Nature and Future of Terrorism in Canada**

**March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2017**

#### **TSAS Workshop**

8:45 – 9:00 am - Welcome & Introduction (Lorne Dawson)

To begin the conference, Dawson noted that the conference had been delayed due to exceptional circumstances and that it was good to be on track again after the move of TSAS to the University of Waterloo. In terms of TSAS activities, there are a number of initiatives to report. First, there was a set of studentships recently awarded to PhD and Masters students, second, TSAS is about to do an adjudication for major research grants, and third there is the upcoming TSAS Summer academy, which will be held at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa this year. Another development with the TSAS network is that Junior research affiliates have offered to organize their own workshop. This will allow them to build a public profile of their work and showcase it to government policymakers and academics. Finally, all the talks at the conference have produced research papers, which are available on the TSAS website.

9:00 – 10:30 am - **Canada Anti-Terrorism Financial Regime**

*Suspicion in the Making: Everyday Policing Against Money Laundering and Terrorist financing*

**Anthony Amicelle** (Criminology, University of Montreal)

In the opening session, Anthony Amicelle presented an overview of his research project from the University of Montreal. His research is focused on suspicion of terrorist financing and money laundering. In particular, he looked at how suspicion is produced. That is, how do banks determine if a transaction is suspicious or not? He describes financial policing as a search for a needle in a haystack. The main research questions here are twofold, 1) How are reasonable grounds for suspicion determined on a daily basis? And 2) When do reporting entities start regarding a transaction or set of transactions as suspicious enough to be reported?

In order to answer these questions, Amicelle looks at the concept of “abnormality” or the idea that certain objects or peoples are supposed to be in certain places, doing certain things. There are three modes of policing to assemble suspicion, surveillance, risk management, and a set of rules to draw attention to any behaviour that disrupts the normal. Banks look for abnormality using official indicators which are published publicly. They also use indicators specific to the client and the context of the transaction. However, the indicators used by

FINTRAC are not intended to cover every possible situation. Moreover, there are different categories of client 'species' (global, cultural and transactional) which allow the monitoring of different types of customers. There is tension on the cultural categorization because some of the categories are based on stereotypes that may or may not be true. Finally, with regards to the transactional category (algorithms are used to track abnormality in this construction). Overall the tracking of these abnormalities is extremely complex even at the most superficial level. It is critical to question assumptions around the current construction of abnormalities and how they are defined, as there are many consequences for tracking based on these assumptions.

In the question period, it was noted that there is also a sociology of money that should be examined when considering these issues. That is, does the type or form of money have an effect on how transactions are performed? Amicelle noted that these notions are included in reporting of some transactions, especially when large amounts of cash are involved. The next question was regarding how profitable customers can be, seeing that banks are primarily concerned with profitability. Amicelle states that banks have ways of mitigating risk and this can be related to profitability, ranking customers with different risk profiles. Finally, it was noted that this procedure may rely heavily on the frontline, for example the clerk at the bank being required to report certain behaviours. Amielle notes that the frontline is indeed very important and that there are a lot of tension on the frontline. For example, how they report indicators can vary a lot.

*Terrorism Financing in Canada: Emergent Risks and the Effectiveness of Existing Mechanisms within Canada's Anti-Terrorism Financing Regime*

**Jeremy Littlewood** (NPSIA, Carleton)

The second speaker in this session was Jez Littlewood, who discussed Terrorism Financing (TF) in Canada and his research program (in collaboration with Dane Rowlands and Teddy Samy) based out of NPSIA at Carleton University. The main research question was whether FINTRAC is equipped to address existing and emerging challenges of TF up to 2020? To do so, the researchers examined existing literature, primary documents, interviews with SMEs, stakeholders, and officials, and user-generated feedback responses and revisions.

In summary, FINTRAC is well equipped to answer challenges, but at the same time there are new challenges arising. For example, the regulatory approach must remain adaptable and dynamic to emerging threats. Financial analysis of TA must be assessed and the performance of current regimes have to have their performance evaluated. In Canada, there is less of a risk than some other Western countries, however it is rising globally and Canada is no exception. One of the biggest challenges is diversity: there are many ways to resource and finance terrorism and current regimes do not capture all of these. The challenge here is that different groups have different strategies, the report identifies 10 groups and looks at these strategies. Littlewood notes that it is hard to find a single way in which terrorist groups have not used to raise money, there is a huge variety of strategies. In the report the researchers provide charts outlining illustrative examples of TF. Current legislation identifies TF as an aspect of every national security investigation, which may not always be true due to the complexity of uncovering these mechanisms.

Policy and regulations by FINTRAC are constantly under review. TF offences are investigated as much as possible; FINTRAC reports number in the hundreds of millions. Networks between FINTRAC-RCMP-CSIS-CRA-CBSA and international partners seem to have good cooperation. Of course, stakeholders always want and expect more typologies, criteria, and specifics; many also requested additional training. The researchers also discuss the 2016 Performance Assessment, which applied effectiveness ratings to several different categories of enforcement. Canada stacks up well against other Western allies but it also has some areas to improve such as CRA's inspections into the charitable sector. Canada does not have a country specific typology of TF, rather there are a wide variety of methods and means of conducting TF. There are also a broad range of potential emerging risks, cryptocurrencies, use of social media, etc.

In the question period, it was noted that low-level financing is hard to detect. With that in mind, do we make too much of a big deal about terrorism financing? Are we devoting too many resources to it? Littlewood responds that we need more concrete data to really answer that question. Some literature says TF resources are wasted, while others say that it is critical to combatting terrorism. Single attacks do not cost a lot of money, so financing and awareness can act as an indicator among many others. So it acts as one strategy. The next question asked what the incentives are to catch anything? How do you invest in TF without grinding the global financial system to a halt? Is this an indicator that Canada is not a big financial player? We know that money is flowing but not as much as bigger players like the US and UK. Canada has to fulfill its obligations to the international community and the interconnected aspect is key. Moreover, frontline training for stakeholders and agencies is an aspect that needs more attention and resources.

10:45 – 12:15 pm - **Developing Best Practices for Counter-Terrorism in Canada**

*A Conceptual Evaluation of Threat Assessment Tools for the Individual Assessment of Terrorism*

**Stephen Hart** (Psychology, Simon Fraser University)

Professor Hart introduced his research project on risk assessment, a collaborative effort with Alana Cook, Elaine Pressman, Steven Strang, and Yan Lin Lim. Coming from a background of clinical psychology, Hart uses his understanding of criminal violence in the context of terrorism. Risk assessment or threat assessment is a vital aspect of Counter Terrorism (CT). Must evaluate both current and future risks. Decision support tools have been used to analyze groups but individuals have only been examined more recently. Three tools have been developed recently, the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA), Multi-level guidelines (MLG) and Extremism risk guidelines (ERG).

VERA focuses on extremist ideology, intended to be used with a wide spectrum of extremism. Used with people who have already been convicted; so, it is an assessment of recidivism. This tool is made up of 31 risk and protective factors that reflect the narratives and networks of people under assessment. The MLG is designed to assess risk for group based violence. It is intended for use with known, suspected or potential terrorists and is an open-

access tool. There are 16 basic risk factors that reflect concerns at different levels in the ecological model of violence and they are grouped into four domains. Finally, there is the ERG, which is focused on “Pathway influences” with convicted offenders. It is used by trained psychologists only. It hasn’t had much public research done on it as it is privately held.

Overall, research on these tools has been scant, so the researchers decided to look at overlapping content between the tools in two studies. First, they conducted an empirical study of MLG versus HCR-20 V3 (a general criminology tool), VERA, and second, they conducted a conceptual analysis of MLG versus VERA 2. Case studies were conducted on 5 well known cases using open source information. MLG and HCR-20 V3 were each coded by two independent raters. The VERA rankings were taken from the original report (Beardsly and Beech 2013). There was no evidence of reliability problems with MLG ratings and the association between MLG and HCR-20 were consistent with expectations. Turning to MLG and VERA, there was inconsistent overlap between them. This finding was surprising to the researchers. There was low overlap between most of the risk factors, only a narrow degree was found. In conclusion Hart’s team found that HCR-20 was relevant to predicting terrorism and can hence be a useful tool for practitioners. They found that the MLG looks more at group and society variables, whereas VERA is better for assessing individuals. Hart’s team recommends that more studies need to be done to compare tools.

Questioner noted that access to classified data is a perennial problem. Presenting them as tools that can help you to “think how to think” is great but many people see them as answers instead. It is a very complex problem that we are trying to solve but humans want an easy answer. Hart replied that the tool is useful even though it can constrain people’s thinking. They can try to stress that the tools change over time and need to incorporate feedback as more information comes in. The next question addressed the application of the tools. Are there age limits within them? Hart replied that there is no age limit and can be used on youth and adults, however it should be considered when applying the tool. The co-author of the paper noted that an academic led effort is not always viable because of the sensitivity of the live data. It would be useful to have open source case studies that are anonymized so that assessors are not biased. In addition, intelligence analysts have been using these tools since the 1940s. It is important to look at the sociology of terrorism as well, and to develop new, interdisciplinary tools for the future.

*Crime and Terror: Evidence-Based Medicine?*

**Ron Levi** (Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto)

Professor Levi in partnership with Carmen Cheung present their research on evidence based responses to crime and terror. Three main strategies were discussed: denial, delegitimization and collective efficacy; policing terror to policing crime; and reflexive CT policy: justification, assessment and feedback. The book presented is aimed at the public, to give a sense of where the public debate can happen. Levi looks at how to define terrorism, is it rime, war or something else? For example, in the legal field the question of whether something is crime or war is always at play. The researchers used NGO reports and put them through a linguistic inquiry and word count, finding that power rather than anger is more significant. They

use a “pragmatic approach” and look at what they know from CT studies, comparing it with other fields of study.

Professor Levi noted that CT studies need to be envisioned as an interdisciplinary endeavour. For example when looking at denial strategies they examined what we assume in CT studies but then add onto that findings from criminology literature which looks at similar deterrence strategies for crime. They also look to organizations such as the mafia and gangs, important to compare literature that has similar goals of disrupting crime, in that similar strategies could be used to disrupt terrorist groups or networks. Another avenue that Levi’s team took was to look at sex-offender strategies such as notification and residence restrictions, finding that they were not effective. However, there is evidence that mobility restrictions may work and could be used on terrorist suspects or convicted individuals. Denial strategies therefore only work when they have effects on perceptions and interactions. Turning to delegitimizing strategies, they looked at the withdrawal of social rewards in the community. From crime, there are some techniques that work for reducing gang activity that could be applied to CT. Moreover, there is evidence from social psychology that moral violence can be reduced if people are given material consequences and socio-moral consequences to their behaviour.

Levi then looked at police cooperation; if there was a lack of cooperation with the police it was often down to a lack of trust in the police and fear of repercussions. There is a need to connect the procedural justice literature with current understandings of how CT strategies work. There is little work done to see how neighbours see each other as dehumanized by the state or law enforcement (this represents a gap in knowledge that needs more research). For example, when a black person is shot in the community by the police we see a drop in 911 calls; the argument here is that police violence is the inverse of procedural justice. Levi also used indicators of success in this project. How can we know whether we are successful if success means that there are no incidents occurring? For this issue, Levi looked at other organizations which would need to use indicators that indicate a non-event. Here monitoring can be useful and big data represents an up and coming way to think about evaluating success. Essentially, indicators from criminology could be utilized for CT.

During the question period, someone posed the idea of ungoverned spaces such as failed states and areas with porous borders; asked how can these techniques be applied there? Levi noted that in some cases there are criminal groups that act as de facto police in these areas. Usually there is someone with the monopoly over the use of force even if it is not administered by the state. Levi also referred to collective efficacy, meaning that the community works together in concert to provide a form of security and collective morality which in turn can help to reduce criminal activity. The next question asked who are the right voices to be involved in this moral debate? How do you call on members of the community who may not be part of mainstream society? Levi responded that in the case of Muslim communities the Imam can be a voice of influence but not the only one, it must be implemented in the entire society. The values need to be espoused by someone important to the individual. In Australia and the UK research is being done on ground-level training programs for reporting potential radicalization. What would a good study look like in order to bridge that gap in Canada? Levi argues that you cannot ask people about terrorism, it is too direct. Rather we need to ask about the moral fabric of society

and get at the issue in a roundabout way. But not sure how to get answers to those kinds of questions without looking in the wrong place.

1:15 – 2:45 pm **Examining Possible Preconditions for Terrorism in Canada**

*Feelings of Attachment and Acceptance among Immigrants in Canada*

**Steve White** (Political Science, Carleton University)

Professor White began the second half of the day by presenting the collaborative research effort by Antoine Bioldeau, Stephen White, Luc Turgoen and Ailsa Henderson. This project is less focused on terrorism specifically but rather focuses on the sense of belonging in the host community. The first research question is “Does it matter if immigrants feel like they belong?” and the second is “What do we mean when we ask whether immigrants ‘belong?’” Within these the researchers ask questions on the relationship of the individual to the host community. There are two ways of looking at this, on the one hand the onus is on the immigrants to assimilate, and on the other it is up to the host community to make immigrants feel a sense of community and belonging. Immigrants ask themselves two questions: 1) do I want to be a member of community? And 2) does the community want me to join in? White notes that they focus more on the second question and look for opportunities to research how that can be achieved.

With regard to the research design, the focus is on visible minority Canadians as per the census definition (growing population, large share of immigrant population, experience of discrimination). To conduct the study there were four samples in four different provinces collected. These were subsequently divided into first generation Canadians and 1.5 or second generation Canadians. It was expected that second generation Canadians would expect higher levels of acceptance / attachment than the earlier generations. Also that the effects of acceptance would vary between groups. Belonging was measured in two dimensions: “how attached do you feel to Canada” and “how much do you feel you have been accepted by Canada?” The researchers also measured different levels of political integration and active engagement in civic and political life.

The results of the experiment demonstrated that both first and second generation Canadians ranked high on attachment and acceptance (approximately 8/10 score on average). Attachment and acceptance are related to each other but they are not identical. It turned out that political engagement worked in tandem with acceptance and attachment. Both values had effects of similar magnitudes, although on the question “would you rather live in Canada than any other country?” those with high levels of attachment correlated much more than those with high levels of acceptance. The pattern between 1<sup>st</sup>, 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generations seem to have similar results, contrary to original expectations. The sample was further divided into four groups, alienated, ambivalent, excluded and full belonging. In conclusion, the study found that there is an added value in thinking about belonging in terms of both attachment and acceptance, and that only when both conditions are met can we have a truly cohesive society. Canada seems to strike a good balance in terms of making people feel welcome when they immigrate.

In the question period, it was asked how this acceptance and attachment relates directly to terrorism as that was not addressed explicitly. White answered that it is relevant to look at political integration. For example voting and joining a political party could mean that the individual has confidence in their ability to affect their society. It is therefore conceivable that higher political integration would result in lower terrorism. Lorne Dawson notes that meta-analysis has shown that the data is confusing, some literature shows a correlation and other literature does not show the same effect. One questioner asked if the research makes any distinction between different backgrounds of the immigrants. White replied that the number of observations at that fine grain level is difficult to analyze and that perhaps further research can look at that factor. White further noted that there are systematic differences between Quebec and the rest of the country when it comes to belonging.

*The Experience of Muslim Civil Society Organizations in Shaping Canadian Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy*

**Tufyal Choudhury** (School of Law, Durham University)

Mr Choudhury ended the third session with his presentation on The Experience of Muslim Civil Society Organizations in Shaping Canadian Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy. He noted that the need to work with communities as a common strategy in CT in Western Europe and North America. Legitimacy is seen as critical to effective and efficient governance, so if government is going to face opposition from groups they need to enhance legitimacy and procedural fairness. That is, people obey the law if they see it as legitimate and that the implementation of the law is fair. There are three main aspects to this process, 1) voice: people have a say in the policy process, 2) neutrality: decision maker is not biased and 3) respect: treated with politeness, courtesy, honesty, non-discrimination in the process. Choudhury notes that there is a social / group identity aspect to procedural fairness, as perceptions are very important as well.

Procedural fairness and CT policy are interlinked. In the UK for example, Muslim perceptions of fairness of implementation and formulation of CT law were found to be the best predictor of willingness to cooperate with the police. Similarly, in Australian Arab communities' perceptions of law legitimacy was the most important predictor of cooperation on CT policing. In Canada, the passing of Bill C51 went quickly and had limited public input. For this study, interviews were conducted with stakeholders that had influence and an interest in Bill C51. There were different groups both opposing and supporting Bill C51. Representatives of Muslim groups that were invited to speak and give evidence were among those interviewed (on both sides of the issue). Some interviewees saw their participation in the Bill C51 debate as an important part of the historical record. Moreover, others saw it as a civic duty to participate, and it lent credence to the organizations legitimacy.

On neutrality, people were wary of the previous experience with Bill C36. At the time, there was a lot of protest and opposition and the government was forced to make changes. This created a diffuse level of support for the idea of affecting change at the policy level on the part of Muslim civil society groups. Some groups felt that there would be a hostility towards any organizations or groups that spoke out against C51, that is, there was a chilling impact and that

caused some groups to remain silent so that they would not appear to go after the government. For example, they may be at risk of losing funding or social services in retaliation for speaking out. Turning now to the respect and civility aspect, most participants felt that the conduct and experience was civil and courteous. However, the NCCM director was asked by one committee member whether they supported terrorism and seemed like a warning and was seen by some as disrespectful. In conclusion, the process was seen to include a wide variety of voices, however it was far from perfect and there is room for improvement in each of the three dimensions covered.

The first question was regarding the “fear” component. As in, was the fear perceived or did they have a point (i.e. would the government really retaliate). Choudhury answers that it was not an isolated incident, that multiple organizations felt the same way, and regardless of if the fear is justified or not, it can still have a chilling effect. Another questioner asked if the groups possessed a “victim mentality” – was there another time in Canada when the government went after those groups? Choudhury looked at specific examples of what happened in the past, so yes there was a legitimate fear and he does not believe it is the result of a victim mentality. The next questioner asked if there were any commenters that were “for” the bill who may have felt repressed? Choudhury noted that there were certain groups that did feel that way, that some of what they were saying could make people react negatively. He said that he was surprised how many people withdrew from the debate and public discussion due to fear, he didn’t think there was that level of apprehension in the wider Muslim society.

3:00 – 4:30 pm **Insights into the Nature and Future of Terrorism in Canada**

*Cheering on the Jihad: An Exploration of Women’s Participation in Online Pro-Jihadist Networks*

**Hillary Peladeau** (delegate for Laura Huey) (Sociology, University of Western Ontario)

Ms Peladau began the fourth session of the day by presenting her joint research project from the University of Western Ontario. The rationale for the study came from the newly explored relationship of terrorist sympathizers (specifically women) and jihadist groups. In particular, it examines the role of female posters online and examines patterns of engagement. Secondly the researchers examined whether the type of jihadist group had any effect on female posted content. The first study was a qualitative study that looked at pro Islamic State accounts and then a second study looked at women posting for Al-Quada related accounts. Twitter was used because of its ease of finding subjects via hashtags and its ubiquity. The researchers used snowball sampling and only included female accounts, in English and associated with one of the named groups. A program called Twitnomy was used to collect and group data; only public accounts were followed and no communication was allowed.

There were six primary patterns of engagement found: 1) emotional support: sharing of ideological bonds, prayers for specific fighters etc., 2) propaganda sharing: posting positive news for ISIS or AQ, negative information about any adversaries, 3) educational tweeting (also a form of ideological support): women explaining jihad, terrorism, how to prepare children for jihad etc., 4) fundraising: small amount of tweets tried to get them to go to a website to donate money, 5) recruitment: indirect messages to encourage women to conduct jihad or encourage their



husbands to do so, 6) support for violence: cheerleading male violence and terrorism, past terrorist attacks (this trend was the most pervasive). The conclusions of this study noted that the sample size was small, and difficult to verify if the account was really run by a woman. In terms of future studies, more social media sites can be included, as well as more pro-jihadist organizations. Lastly there needs to be increased vigilance on twitter, as well as different strategies used for different groups as their strategies are not the same.

Questioner noted that with ISIS it is the first time we see an increased participation of women. Speculates that this is the first time there is a “social media” terrorist group (ISIS) so is social media the cause of that or is it just more visible now? Peladeau answered that it could be a bit of both, that ISIS supporters had to adapt to the current climate which included social media. Moreover, because the IS needs people to make up its “state” it should be more active in recruitment. A second questioner asks about the methodology, how is it possible to know whether it is woman or a man running the account? To this Peladeau notes that sometimes the accounts had linked blogs or Facebook accounts as well as photos and other indicators that the account is run by a woman.

The next questioner asked why ISIS was so much more successful in recruiting women? Part of the answer is that there is an ongoing conflict which makes it more of a pressing issue, second is that often it is women going with family members to the conflict, third it is the increased ubiquity of social media and its reach. Peladeau answered that those were all reasons and that most of the women had their location services turned off so it was difficult to track where they were from. Also, many of the women were young women, which was evidenced by their speech patterns and issues discussed. Finally, a questioner asks about the moral policing from women to other women. Here it was noted by Peladeau that it was often directed towards the Western way of life and Westernized Muslim women showing their faces and other “un-Islamic” behaviour.

### *The Future of Right-Wing Terrorism in Canada*

**Richard Parent** (Police Studies, Simon Fraser University)

The final presentation of the workshop was given by Dr Parent (in partnership with James O Ellis III) and looked at the Future of Right Wing Terrorism in Canada. The research questions for this project were, 1) What is the range of scenarios for future right wing terrorism in Canada, based on connections to groups in the US and Europe; 2) Which factors may mitigate the most likely scenarios and 3) How might this look different in Canada than in the US and Europe. Parent notes that there is a larger influx of immigration coming from the west which has stoked the right wing extremist groups. There is steady right wing extremist activity in Canada for over 50 years, and anti-immigrant sentiment is constantly cropping up. Political change, social change and other societal shifts tend to stir up this type of sentiment.

Based on historically strong connections, what is going on in Europe does effect Canada. Right wing extremists are agitated by several interconnected issues: anti-government, racism, fascism, white nationalism, anti-Semitism, anti-immigration, anti-globalization, anti-abortion, anti-gay, anti-taxation, pro-militia and pro-gun rights. There are also different types of right wing

extremists; usually argue for the superiority of their own race or national group. Future extinction of their liberty, culture, or race is assured unless action is taken. The KKK is the oldest right wing extremist group active in Canada; skinheads have similar beliefs. Other worrying trends include holocaust denial, lone wolf attacks like Andres Brevik in Norway etc. Lone wolves are very difficult to detect, much of the ideology of these individuals lines up with right-wog extremism. In Germany, more recently, migrants and their homes were attacked more than 3500 times in 2016. Most attacks are minor but some are more serious. In the US, there were 370+ homicides between 1990-2010. Lately there have been many anti-Semitic attacks in the US. In addition, many police killings have occurred in the past several years and there seems to be an increasing trend of this type of targeted violence. In Canada, the problem is smaller but still has a devastating impact. Mass casualty attacks do not happen as often as in the US. In terms of the future of right wing terrorism, Canadian security agencies need to pay more attention to this issue. Also, better protection of immigrant communities is required; a recent study by the McGill institute indicates that Canadian society is not as tolerant as we think, a serious anti-immigrant sentiment could be afoot. There are major underlying tensions between immigrant groups and natives throughout the West. Canada also must prepare for more standoffs with Freemen-on-the-Land and similar groups.

In the final question and answer period, the first questioner asked about President Trump and the alt-right. Does it exist and what is it? Parent notes that it comes back to populism, the average person wants to be heard, to have a voice. There is also a lot of fear of “the other,” but Canadians tend to get along well and be proud of our diversity. We would be foolish to ignore the forces that are behind the rise of the alt-right. The next questioner asked about the right wing in Canada and elsewhere, are they learning from other groups and if so what can we do about it? Parent answers that it is easy to emulate these attacks and the US influences Canada to a great degree. It is easy to go back and forth and this may result in movement of people and ideas. The third questioner asked, “Is there a more public face of the right in Canada?” Not a growth per say but the middle group is eroding and softening. This can lead more people to go to the extremes. Most Canadians welcome immigration especially from US to Canada, but there is a potential saturation point. Has the right wing been included in the discussion or just drowned out? There is a role for government to encourage the open discussion of ideas and to have fruitful debates. The far right is starting to mainstream certain ideas in the UK and that may be happening here. The final question asks, “to what extent is religion a motivating factor?” In the US, it is a big issue, fundamental Christians feel that they have to protect society and their religion. Trump campaigned on anti-abortion and the military. When it comes religion versus society the former can win out.

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