



**Turning A New Leaf:
Developments in Research and Policy on Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism**

**Thursday, May 2 and Friday, May 3, 2013
Minto Suite Hotel, Ottawa**

AGENDA

May 2 / Day 1

May 2 / Day 1

- 8:30 am Arrival and Registration
- 9:00-9:15 am **Welcome**
- Martin Bouchard (Simon Fraser University, TSAS Associate Director Research)
- 9:15-10:45 am **Panel 1: Current Issues in Research on Terrorism**
Moderator: John Schmidt
- Andre Gerolymatos (Simon Fraser University)
The Past is Present: The Roots of Modern Terrorism
 - Louise Shelley (George Mason University)
The Business of Terrorism
- 10:45 am Break**
- 11:00-12:15 pm **Panel 2: Counter-Terrorism Institutions**
Moderator: Ritu Banerjee
- Veronica Kitchen (University of Waterloo)
Integration in Counter-Terrorism Institutions
 - Adam Molnar (University of Victoria)
Exploring Integrated Responses to Counter-terrorism
- 12:15-1:15 pm Lunch**

May 2 / Day 1

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1:15-2:45 pm

Panel 3: Trends in Counter-Terrorism

Moderator: Kevin O'Brien

- Ronald Crelinsten (Royal Roads University)
*From Reactive to Proactive Counter-terrorism:
Implications for Canadian Institutions and Policies*
- Benoit Dupont (University of Montreal)
*Security Networks and Counter-terrorism: a Reflection on
the Limits of Adversarial Isomorphism*

2:45 pm

Break

3:00-4:00 pm

Panel 4: Security Issues, Global and Local

Moderator: Tasleem Budhwani

- Siobhan O'Neil (UCLA)
Counter-Terrorism Policymaking and Domestic Public Opinion
- Karine Côté-Boucher, (York University)
*Between "Dobermans" and "Hush Puppies":
Generational Struggles at Canadian Customs*

End of Day One

Day 1 Workshop Abstracts

Day 1, Panel 1

Andre Gerolymatos

The Past is Present: The Roots of Modern Terrorism

Terrorism in all its manifestations represents the greatest security challenge in the 21st century. Although the success of the Western states and some of those in the developing world in combating terrorism have met with considerable success, including the killing of Osama bin Laden, the problem persists. In particular, it has become a factor in the politics of the Middle East and parts of Africa. It can be argued that the death of bin Laden did not implode al-Qaeda but freed it to morph into dozens of incarnations. Despite the immediacy of the Muslim terrorist threat, the conditions that spawned this virulent form of Islam reach back to the post First World War period. It can be conceived, in part, as a by-product of the colonization of the Middle East and North Africa by the British, French, and the Italians. Other considerations for the radical response of the militant Muslims emerge from the transformation of the Middle East in the periods before and after the Second World War, as well as in the era of the Cold War.

Louise Shelley

The Business of Terrorism

Too little attention has been paid to the business of terrorism. Even though organized crime has been addressed as a “continuing criminal enterprise” that depends on corruption to survive, this same approach has not often been applied to politicized non-state actors. Terrorist analyses have generally focused on individual actors, group dynamics or the general issue of terrorist financing of a specific group rather than understanding that terrorists in different contexts can function like businessmen. The seizures of files and computer discs from the FARC, Turkish Hizbollah and PKK, the IRA, the Haqqani Network and the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan have given a window into the financial operations of these terrorist groups—their organization’s revenues and expenditures. The presentation will focus on their approach to product mix, professional services, cost-benefit analyses, tax strategies, supply chains, market dominance, competitive advantage, targets of opportunity and innovation and use of technology. It will examine the ways they obtain access to the best human capital through their global networks.

Day 1, Panel 2

Veronica Kitchen

Integration in Counter-Terrorism Institutions

One of the ways that government institutions have sought to mitigate the so-called silo effect is by creating integrated institutions—that is, by co-locating or seconding officials in new units where they work together. In Canada, the RCMP’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) are an example of such an institution: RCMP officials work together with CSIS, CBSA, municipal and provincial police to combat national security threats. What are the effects of such integration? Do we get better policy outcomes? Are they successful in mitigating the silo effect? How are the perspectives of team members on security changed by integration? How does integration intersect with other kinds of partnerships, across borders (transnationalism) or with the private sector (privatization)? What can perspectives from social psychology, management, and security studies tell us about how integration might work? How might integration function differently in the heavily securitized, secret realm of counter-terrorism?

Adam Molnar

Exploring Integrated Responses to Counter-terrorism

Canada’s counter-terrorism responses are characterized by extensive inter-agency partnerships (Public Safety Canada 2012). Diverse authorities are increasingly brought together under a common rationale of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of counter-terrorism responses. This presentation explores a particular set of interagency activities in the area of national security that includes intelligence, public safety, military, and law enforcement agencies. In particular, I draw on interviews and institutional analysis conducted with the Vancouver Police Department’s Military Liaison Unit (MLU) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Integrated National Security Teams (INSETs) in the context of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics. The Vancouver 2010 Olympics served as a key catalyst for the development of novel institutional partnerships in Canada by providing opportunities for planning and joint-exercise initiatives involving municipal, federal, and international authorities. Here, I explore a range prospects and limits surrounding inter-organizational partnerships, including jurisdictional tensions, the merging of distinct organizational cultures, information sharing norms, as well as ongoing uses of technology in the areas of national security and law enforcement.

Day 1, Panel 3

Ronald Crelinsten

From Reactive to Proactive Counterterrorism: Implications for Canadian Institutions and Policies

The main idea of this presentation is that counterterrorism has become increasingly proactive. This has important implications for a variety of institutions and policies. In the area of criminal justice, it means more proactive and intelligence-led policing, increasing use of sting operations and informers, and early arrests to disrupt plots. In the area of intelligence, it means widening surveillance nets, the identification of dangerous classes of people (profiling; radicalization), and increasing securitization across policy domains. In the area of criminal law, it means more speech offences, criminalizing membership in organizations, and “facilitation or support of terrorism” offences aimed at fundraising and recruitment. In the military realm, it means more reliance on drones for surveillance and targeted killings, and more intervention in failed and failing states to strike terrorist training camps and militant groups directly. This trend produces increasing strains on due process, human rights, international humanitarian law, and policy coordination and harmonization.

Benoit Dupont

Security Networks and Counter-terrorism: a Reflection on the Limits of Adversarial Isomorphism

The growing body of knowledge on the structure of terrorist networks, their flexibility to adapt to very hostile environments and their resilience in the face of law enforcement disruption, has spawned the idea that “it takes a network to fight a network”. A number of counter-terrorism strategies have resulted from this new philosophy, which attempt to leverage the network paradigm in order to improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of security bureaucracies. However, in this presentation, I argue that some of the risks (or costs) inherent to the adoption of this nodal approach have been underestimated – or plainly ignored, despite their serious implications on the democratic governance of security. Three crucial dilemmas (the trust, information and legality dilemmas) faced by counter-terrorism networks will help explain why adversarial isomorphism should be considered with great caution and why bureaucracies should not be discarded from the counter-terrorism toolbox.

Day 1, Panel 4

Siobhan O'Neil

Counter-Terrorism Policymaking and Domestic Public Opinion

Historical evidence indicates that statesmen feel pressure to denounce negotiations with terrorists as a policy option, and on the occasion when they pursue negotiations, they often do so through third party mediators and in secret so as to create plausible deniability in the event of public backlash. Are their fears warranted? Will the public punish a leader for negotiating with a terrorist challenger, and if so, is the public's response the result of audience costs or a general revulsion for terrorists and any conciliatory policy toward them? To answer this question, and overcome the selection bias inherent in empirical studies, I conduct a survey experiment to test whether audience costs apply to terrorist crises. This study will make a definitive contribution to both science and society: Its findings will inform the literatures on audience costs and foreign policymaking, while contributing to the counterterrorism policy debate, an especially valuable contribution given the current efforts to negotiate with the Taliban.

Karine Côté-Boucher

Between 'Dobermans' & 'Hush Puppies': Generational Struggles at Canadian Customs

Whereas studies in the sociology of organizations have long established that frontline government officials function as *ad hoc* policy-makers, security research and high-level policy officials alike seldom acknowledge the disconnection between security policy and the daily reality of those whose work it is to interpret and apply security regulations and programs. A recent research in the "commercial sections" of 5 land-based ports of entry has found evidence of generational tensions between border officers that have consequences on the implementation of border security policy. While senior officers privilege hard-earned interviewing skills that focus on visual, face-to-face assessments of truck drivers, rookies are more likely to integrate diverse technologies into their risk analyses and tend to regard their enforcement powers as intimately connected with the carrying of a firearm. These generational differences in security work methods carry implications for CBSA operations regarding risk management, officer training and management of ports of entry.