

Title: Research into How Resources are Acquired, Moved and Used to Support Acts of Terrorism

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Research Question: The study was directed to answer six questions on terrorist resourcing in Canada through a comparative analysis that identified: resourcing activities; actors involved; interconnections of activities; importance of different forms; implications of the activities; means of response; and, the relative value of conducting analysis through the Terrorist Resourcing Model (TRM) lens.

Importance: The Canadian approach to counter-terrorist financing is largely premised on the money laundering model. This is contested. An alternative approach is John Schmidt's Terrorist Resourcing Model (TRM) that takes a broader view of terrorist resourcing. Its application in this study advances the state of knowledge about resourcing activities in or with connections to Canada and counter-resourcing strategies.

Research Findings: Open source research of terrorist resourcing by five listed entities in Canada from 2001 to 2015 revealed that: the most prevalent resourcing actors were non-profit organizations; the most prevalent form of resourcing was fundraising by those organizations that targeted individual cash donations of small amounts; funds were pooled and transmitted through chartered banks; TRM provides a flexible supply chain model but whose elements, or stages, were only partially visible in an open source search; TRM was broad enough as a model to cover the different organizational structures, aims and resourcing requirements and means of the organizations studied, although various elements of the model were not visible; TRM shifts the focus away from only financing, an element of the model, and permits a broader interpretation of how terrorist organizations, cells and individuals resource themselves for acts of terrorism.

Implications: This project revealed that open source data is sparse and that the Canadian ML/TF measures being taken at this time to defeat the movement of terrorist financial assets and high value exchange goods are targeting the appropriate actors and activities, although the treatment of domestic electronic fund transfers and clarity on the indicators that trigger a suspicious transfer report (STR) require reconsideration. The ML/TF does not address the acquisition (free or stolen) of funds and goods, their conversion to end-use goods and services, or issues related to propaganda and recruitment. Widening the focus beyond the movement and translation of funds and exchange goods would permit a more inclusive and holistic view of resourcing that would inform a more comprehensive counter-terrorist resourcing policy.